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Abstract: 
The focus of this paper is to examine the role of Obafemi Awolowo in restoring 
Nigeria’s unity after the ill-fated secession attempt by the Eastern Region on 30 May, 
1967. The paper obtained its data extensively from secondary sources. This is made up 
of books, journal articles, newspaper reports and government publications relevant to 
the study. It employs the historical method of data analysis in interrogating information 
obtained. The paper notes that the Nigerian civil war of 1967-1970, a military response 
to the political conflict between the North and the East, almost ended in a failure. The 
impasse was, however, resolved through the strategy of starvation and economic 
blockade initiated by Awolowo which eventually instigated the surrender of Biafra 
forces to the Federal Government’s forces in January, 1970. The paper concludes that 
Awolowo’s ingenuity and strategic advice eventually saved the Nigerian state from 
imminent decimation and balkanization. His prudent management of the national 
treasury, as finance minister during the war years, further aided the implementation of 
the 3Rs post-war programme of reconciliation, rehabilitation and reconstruction. This, 
no doubt, helped significantly in stabilizing the Nigerian polity after the cessation of 
hostilities in January, 1970.  
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1. Introduction  
 
Nigeria’s territorial integrity was at the brink of jeopardy barely seven years after her 
independence. This was due to the declaration of secession of the Eastern region from 
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Nigeria by Odumegwu Ojukwu on 30 May, 1967; and the subsequent outbreak of civil 
war on 6 July, 1967. The war shook the Nigerian nation to its foundation and may 
indeed be regarded as the most potent threat to the survival of the country till date. The 
war almost ended in a stalemate and the secessionist ‘Republic of Biafra’ almost became 
a reality. The reason was that, contrary to expectation, it took the Federal Military 
Government of Nigeria (FMG) thirty months (6th July, 1967-15 January, 1970) to curb the 
insurrection and restore the nation’s territorial integrity. This in turn was due to the 
failure of series of strategies implemented by the FMG to crush the insurrection up till 
1968. Incidentally, the subsequent strategy of economic blockade, proposed by Chief 
Obafemi Awolowo, the then Federal Commissioner of Finance and Vice Chairman of 
Federal Executive Council, proved to be highly effective as the resultant hunger and 
starvation forced the Biafra Army into quick surrender.  
 Judging from the above, this paper critically examines Obafemi Awolowo’s roles 
before, during and after the Nigerian war of unity. His intervention to prevent the war; 
the idea of economic blockade during the war, as well as, his role in facilitating the 
implementation of the post-war policy of reconciliation, reconstruction and 
rehabilitation are substantially interrogated.  
 
2. Statement of the Problem 
 
The Nigerian State has been under intense threat of secession and separatist agitations 
since independence. At least five secession threats were issued in Nigeria’s chequered 
political history between 1950 and 1964. For instance, at the All Nigeria Constitutional 
Conference held at Ibadan in January 1950, the Northern delegation threatened to 
secede from the federation on two grounds: if the North was not granted half of the 136 
seats in the proposed House of Representative on ground that the North contained 
about half of the population of the country; and if allocation of revenue derived from 
taxation was not done on per capital basis (Awofeso, 2017: 41). Though the Eastern and 
Western regions opposed the demands, they were nevertheless granted. In 1953, as 
fallout of the defeat of Anthony Enahoro’s motion for self-government at the House of 
Representative by Northern members, the Western and Eastern members of the House 
staged a walk out as a sign of protest against the attitude of Northern legislators. The 
northerners were ridiculed by the Lagos crowd to the extent that on getting back to the 
north, they issued a threat to secede from the federation (Ojo, 2004:84). Also in 1959, 
Ahmadu Bello issued yet the third northern threat to secede should the NCNC and the 
AG form a coalition government at the end of that year’s general election. For once in 
1950, the West also threatened to break away from the rest of the country if Lagos was 
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separated from the Western region. Similarly, Dr Micheal Opara of the Eastern region 
rejected the 1963 census results which he described as ‚worse than useless‛ (West African 
Pilot, 29 February, 1964; cited in Ojo, 2004:85). He demanded that the figures of the 
north be cancelled and threatened to pull Eastern Region out of Nigeria if that was not 
done. 
 But while the above instances turned out to be mere threats to drive home 
particular regional grievances, the first recorded attempt by any group to effect 
secession from independent Nigeria, though brief, was led by Major Isaac Jasper Adaka 
Boro in February, 1966 (Awofeso, 2017: 41). Adaka Boro, was an Ijaw youth who 
founded the Niger Delta Volunteer Service (NDVS), a militia group made up of about 
150 young-educated Ijaw youths. The group employed guerilla warfare method to press 
home its protest against what Aremu (2012:3) refers to as ‚continued underdevelopment 
and neglect of the region‛ by the Nigerian government. On 23 February 1966, Boro 
formally declared the independence of the Ijaw-speaking areas of the former Eastern 
region from Nigeria. He named the new state ‚Niger Delta Republic‛. The Federal 
Military Government led by Aguiyi Ironsi engaged the insurgents in a gun battle. They 
were defeated by the federal forces after 12 days of intense battle. That was perhaps the 
first recorded desperate attempt made by any constituent part to actually leave the 
Nigerian Federation (Muzan, 2014: 217)  
 Incidentally however, perhaps the most vociferous and violent attempt to 
balkanize the nation occurred 15 months later when Lt. Colonel Odumegwu Ojukwu 
declared the independence of Eastern region from Nigeria on 30 May, 1967 and 
christened the new country the ‚Republic of Biafra‛ (Kirk-Greene, 1971). Largely 
because General Yakubu Gowon was not prepared to rule over a divided nation, he 
vowed to preserve the unity and territorial integrity of the Nigerian federation at all 
cost. Consequently, he declared war against the ‘Republic of Biafra’ on 6 July, 1967 
ostensibly to bring back the Eastern region into the country. The war came to a halt on 
15 January, 1970. 
 The Federal Military Government of Nigeria had hoped to win the war in a very 
short space of time. At least two factors suggested this. One, the Adaka Boro 
insurrection had earlier been crushed in just twelve days. Two, the Eastern region was 
already decimated through its division into three states during the states creation 
exercise of 27 May, 1967. The Igbo had only one out of the three. The hitherto minority 
groups had two states of their own. Their support for the FMG was thus regarded as a 
foregone conclusion. But alas, the war dragged for thirty solid months.   
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3. Obafemi Awolowo And His Involvement In The Nigerian Civil War 
 
Chief Obafemi Awolowo played a pivotal role in the restoration of Nigeria’s unity and 
territorial integrity during the Nigerian civil war of 1967-1970. He was indeed one of the 
major architects of Nigeria's victory over secession in the 30-month Civil War. 
Awolowo’s involvement in the Nigerian civil war came at three intervals: before, 
during and after the war.   
a. Awolowo’s involvement before the outbreak of civil war 
It would be recalled that an attempt by the Ghanaian Head of State, Gen. J.A. Ankrah to 
resolve the political impasse between Yakubu Gowon and Odumegwu Ojukwu at 
Aburi, Ghana between 4 and 5 January, 1967 failed. This was due to controversies that 
surrounded the interpretation of the Aburi Accord and the refusal of General Gowon to 
implement same. Ojukwu had insisted on its implementation or the East would secede 
(Abubakar, 2002: 257; Aremu, 2014: 4). All hope seemed lost on a peaceful resolution of 
the crisis. 
 However, on May 1, 1967 Chief Awolowo and other Yoruba leaders met at his 
residence at Ibadan to deliberate on the stand of the Western region in the impending 
war which they envisaged may follow the eventual secession of the East. Four major 
policy proposals were deliberated and agreed upon as follows: 
a) only a peaceful solution must be found to arrest the present worsening stalemate 
and restore normalcy; 
b) the Eastern Region must be encouraged to remain part of the Federation;  
c) if the Eastern Region is allowed by acts of omission or commission to secede 
from or opt out of Nigeria, then Western Region and Lagos must also stay out of 
the Federation;  
d) the people of Western Nigeria or Lagos would participate in the Ad hoc 
Constitutional Committee or any similar body only on the basis of absolute 
equality with other Region of the Federations (Teniola, 2017; Ogunsanwo, 
2009:125).  
 By implication, the West sued for peace and did not support a violent resolution 
of the political conflict between the Eastern and Northern regions. According to 
Awolowo, ‚those who advocate the use of force for the settlement of our present problems 
should stop a little and reflect.  I can see no vital and abiding principle involved in any war 
between the North and the East‛ (Ogunsanwo, 2009:125). 
  In his capacity as the Vice Chairman of the Federal Executive Council and as the 
most prominent and neutral civilian political figure in the country, he led a four-man 
team of the fourteen member National Conciliation Committee (NCC) to Enugu on 6 
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May 1967 to persuade Colonel Ojukwu to reconsider his stand on secession and 
embrace dialogue. (Ogunsanwo, 2009:125). Unfortunately, Ojukwu reiterated his 
resolute stand not to have anything to do with reconciliation with the North and 
Gowon (Ogunsanwo, 2009:128). But then, Awolowo made his stand known to Ojukwu 
against the planned secession bid which he considered ‚a tragedy and disservice to the 
memories of all those who have gone for Nigeria to be disbanded‛ (Ogunsanwo, 2009:130). At 
the end of the day, the intervention of Chief Awolowo to persuade Emeka Ojukwu not 
to secede but allow a peaceful constitutional settlement of the crisis also failed. Sooner, 
Ojukwu declared the secession of the Eastern region on 30 May, 1967.  The war lasted 
endlessly, almost ending in a stalemate until the decisive strategy of economic blockade 
and starvation was introduced by the Federal Government of Nigeria.  The idea was 
mooted by Chief Awolowo. Within about seven months of implementation, the Biafran 
army surrendered and the war came to an end.  
b. The Outbreak of Civil War and the involvement of Obafemi Awolowo 
When the civil war finally broke out on 6 July, 1967, Ojukwu was disappointed in 
Awolowo’s refusal to take the Western region out of Nigeria and for supporting the 
north against the East. This was fallout of Awolowo’s earlier pronouncement on 1 May, 
1967 that ‚if the Eastern Region is allowed by acts of omission or commission to secede from or 
opt out of Nigeria, then Western Region and Lagos must also stay out of the Federation‛ and 
Awolowo’s insistence at the London Constitutional Conference of 1953 that a secession 
clause should be inserted in the then proposed Nigeria’s 1954 constitution (Teniola, 
2017; Ogunsanwo, 2009:130).  
 It must be noted, however, that as mentioned earlier, Awolowo and his Yoruba 
political elites were not ready for war and actually sued for peace and dialogue in 
resolving the crisis on the eve of secession of the Eastern region. Apart from that, 
inadequate military preparation, wise counsel of Yoruba political leaders and 
application of tact and diplomacy may also be regarded as plausible explanation for the 
West’s decision against secession then. This was Chief Awolowo’s submission of 1 May, 
1967 that ‚We have neither the military might, nor the overwhelming advantage of numbers 
here in Western Nigeria and Lagos‛ (cited in Teniola, 2017). As it were, the West and the 
North were both committed to the ‘One Nigeria’ project right from the first day of 
secession of the East. Meanwhile, in order to better appreciate Awolowo’s role in the 
war years, it is expedient to examine briefly, the war aims and strategies of both the 
FMG and Biafra as highlighted below.   
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3.1 The War Aims 
One major war aim of the Federal Military Government was to affirm the fact that 
secession was a violation of Nigeria’s territorial integrity (Akinseye-George, 2002:452).  
In this wise, secession was regarded as unconstitutional and must, therefore, be crushed 
by all legal means, including force. Secondly, the Federal Government wanted to keep 
Nigeria one and thus retain the privilege and pride of being the most populous and 
greatest State in Africa (Cervenka, 1971:75). More importantly, however, the Nigerian 
government was determined to keep the Eastern Region within Nigeria in order to 
‚preserve the territorial integrity and unity of Nigeria‛ (Atofarati, 1992; Cervenka 1971:75 
cited in Agbese, 2002:142)). This was well-pronounced in the Gowon’s saying then that 
‚to keep Nigeria one is a task that must be done‛ (Osadolor, 2002:77). Even when 
sympathisers from Europe and North America called for a ceasefire because of the 
carnage recorded in the course of the war, Gowon retorted that ‚this war must be fought 
to the finish‛ (Harnischfeger, 2012). 
 Falola and Heaton (2008:174) have suggested three reasons why the Federal 
Government of Nigeria wanted to keep the Eastern Region within a united Nigeria.  
One, many in the government, including Gowon, actually believed in the preservation 
of Nigeria’s unity. Two, the land claimed by the Biafrans had about 67% of known oil 
reserves in Nigeria which constituted a major potential of wealth for the country.  
Three, there was also the fear that, if the secession was allowed to go unchecked, other 
minority groups in the country might also be tempted to take a similar step.  Truly, this 
last fact has justification in Chief Obafemi Awolowo’s threat earlier on 1 May, 1967 that 
if the Eastern Region was allowed to secede from Nigeria, the Western Region and 
Lagos must also stay out of the Federation (Nwankwo, 1974). Since no reasonable 
leader would be happy presiding over a depleted nation, Gowon was hell-bent to 
prevent the seeming spiral effect of the Eastern Region’s secession attempt. 
 On the side of Biafra, the war was basically a nationalist war of self-
determination. Its basic objective was to protect the newly carved state of Biafra from 
annihilation by the Federal Government of Nigeria. Specifically, the pogroms of 1966 
and the hunger blockade of the war years were interpreted by Colonel Ojukwu and 
Igbo elders as an attempt to wipe out the whole Igbo population. The conclusion then 
was that the Igbo were living ‚in the midst of enemies‛ and were marginalised in Nigeria; 
thus it did not serve their best interests to remain a part of Nigeria (Kieh, 2002:10). This 
particular factor, according to Akinseye-George (2002:445), reinforced Igbo’s resolve to 
quit Nigeria in exercise of their right to self-determination. Emeka Ojukwu later in 1991 
explains this Biafran war aim in poetic manner as reported by the Hallmark Weekly 
Magazine of 20 January, 1999.  In his words: 
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 ‚A man to whom the State brings no benefit has every right and indeed is obliged to 
 question the oneness of that State if perforce it must include him.  For a man to whom 
 unity remains that of Jonah in the belly of a whale, that man must question his situation. 
 ….To this man in extreme lies the obligation to quit.‛ (cited in Ojukwu, 2002:346) 
 
 Judging from the above discussion, it may be rightly asserted to a large extent, 
that the Biafran war aim was to save itself from extinction as a people. 
 
3.2 The War Strategies 
Wars, across the globe, are fought using different forms of strategies. By war strategies 
here, we mean the methods of arranging and manoeuvring large bodies of military 
forces during armed conflicts. Strategies in military warfare may also be used to refer to 
the science or art of employing all the military, economic, political and other resources 
of a country to achieve the objects of war (Cohen, 2015). Every military action, whether 
large-scale or small-scale, must have a clear objective that is followed, despite possible 
distractions. Hence, military strategies and tactics are essential to the conduct of warfare 
as they assist in the planning, coordination and general direction of military operations 
to meet overall political and military objectives. In the case of the Nigerian civil war, 
both the Federal Military Government (FMG) and the ‚Republic of Biafra‛ 
experimented with a number of strategies in the course of the war. For the sake of 
clarity, it is essential to discuss their respective strategies separately, starting with that 
of the ‘Republic of Biafra’. 
 
3.3 War Strategies of Biafra 
Biafra’s war strategies, borne largely out of desperation, started long before the official 
declaration of independence of the Eastern Region from Nigeria. For instance, on 30 
March, 1967, Ojukwu enacted three major edicts largely as a way of showing his 
discontentment with the Federal Military Government of Nigeria and then to generate 
some funds for the impending ‘war’ that could follow the secession of the Eastern 
Region. These were: 
a) The Legal Education Edict which broke educational ties between the Eastern 
Region and the rest of the federation; 
b) The Court of Appeal Edict that ended the right of judicial appeal to the Federal 
Supreme Court and 
c) The Revenue Collection Edict which ordered that all revenues originating from 
the East be paid to the Eastern Regional treasury rather than the Federal 
Government. 
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 Apart from that, Ojukwu also decided to sequestrate all federal institutions and 
properties that were situated in the Eastern Region (Ojeleye, 2016:44-45). 
 Another strategy of Biafra was the effective deployment of propaganda. Biafra 
propaganda indeed played a pivotal role in the political and diplomatic conduct of the 
Nigerian civil war. The basic aims of Biafra’s propaganda were to: manage information 
to boost the morale of the Biafran people; instill a survival ethos in its population at 
home despite very limited communication resources; and elicit sympathy from world 
public opinion through the manipulation of the sentiments of potential friends in 
Africa, the United States, Europe, the Far East, the United Nations and the global 
humanitarian and Christian organisations like Caritas and the World Council of 
Churches (Davies, 1995:19; Doron, 2014; Decker, 2016). Their propaganda campaign 
portrayed the war as the only possible response to a genocidal campaign against them 
with Odumegwu Ojukwu being portrayed as the saviour of Biafrans from genocide and 
pogrom at the hands of the Federal Nigerian Government (Doron, 2014). Despite the 
fact that Biafra's message remained largely focused on the genocide theme, Biafran 
propaganda was remarkably agile in its ability to adapt to the war's changing 
circumstances. Ojukwu constantly told Biafrans largely through television, radio and 
leaflets that "the price of liberty is eternal vigilance" and that they had to make sacrifices for 
their liberation from the tyranny of the Gowon regime (Davies, 1995:19). It was 
precisely that relationship between the aims of Biafran propaganda and the Biafrans' 
resourcefulness that allowed that message to be so effective during the war (Anthony, 
2014). 
 It is instructive to note that the pictures of starvation, especially kwashiorkor-
ridden children, on both the print and electronic media, especially, the television, raised 
very deep sympathy for Biafra internationally. Biafra eventually succeeded in attracting 
relief supplies from the Dutch and Chinese governments (Cronje, 1972:360). It equally 
gave them access to military supplies from Portugal, South Africa, Rhodesia (now 
Zimbabwe ) and Israel (St Jorre 1972:218-9) in addition to the ones from France 
(Tedheke, 2007:422).In short, the increasing propaganda occasioned by the gruesome 
humanitarian conditions in Biafra drew world conscience in favour of the secessionist 
republic. It must, however, be added that while it aided the relief operations that went 
into Biafra, it did not do much to aid the international recognition of the secessionist 
republic. This was because, only four African countries officially recognised Biafra, 
namely Tanzania, Gabon, Ivory Coast and Zambia (Tedheke, 2007: 421-422). 
 Meanwhile, a number of individuals contributed meaningfully to the success of 
Biafra’s propaganda machinery. These included, but not limited to, Cyprian Ekwensi 
who headed the Broadcasting Corporation of Biafra and the Biafra Information Service; 
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Uche Chukwumerije who was the head of the Directorate of Propaganda and M.C.K. 
Ajuluchukwu who was in charge of print media propaganda, and who managed the 
Eastern Outlook which later became the Biafran Sun, the leading newspaper in the East 
(Olukotun, 2002:385). By January 1968, Ekwensi was given another added responsibility 
as Head of Biafra’s Overseas Press Service. By virtue of the new position, Ekwensi 
became responsible for the foreign distribution of the directorate propaganda’s daily 
and weekly bulletins (Decker, 2016). He also censored all unofficial news stories written 
from Biafra for international consumption. In this respect, the Biafra’s Overseas Press 
Service entered into a partnership with a Geneva-based information outfit called the 
Markpress News Feature Services, Switzerland. Ekwensi continuously fed the 
Markpress Agency with daily news and bulletins and coordinated further international 
press coverage that focused on Biafra’s cause.  
 Radio Biafra also added more bite to Biafra’s war propaganda. The radio, 
especially its transistor form, was easily acquired by the common man. It was also 
mobile. All that the average man needed to access information through his radio was 
just the battery which was cheaply available. This was well utilized to publicize 
relevant information by Biafra. The Biafra radio maximally utilized the moral boosting 
ability of war time information. Victory on the federal side was downplayed while 
Biafran breakthroughs were massively relayed as a sign of Biafra unity and prospect as 
a virile nation (Decker, 2016).  
 Though Biafra lost the war, the beauty of its propaganda was the high degree of 
success achieved in the campaign for international legitimacy which equally ensured 
Biafra’s survival for three solid years.  
 
3.4 War strategies of the FMG 
Available records indicate that the FMG of Nigeria implemented with different war 
strategies in the course of her triumph over the Biafran forces. The first strategy, which 
indeed was a pre-emptive action, was political involving states creation on 27 May, 1967 
(Achebe, 2012:91). Prior to that date, the Nigerian Federation was made up of four 
regions: Northern, Eastern, Western and the Mid-Western regions. This was, however, 
abolished and replaced with a new structural arrangement of twelve states. The Eastern 
Region was divided into three states, two of them dominated by non-Igbo minorities. 
More importantly, the Central Eastern State of the Igbo was land-locked. 
 It is true that Gowon declared that the states were essentially created to correct 
‚the huge imbalance among the then existing four regions‛ and thereby allay the fears of 
domination by the minority (Agbese, 2002:131; Gowon 1968); it was indeed very clear 
that the states creation exercise was essentially a political strategy to weaken the 
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support base of the Eastern Region and undercut support for the impending ‚Republic 
of Biafra‛ among the minorities of the Eastern Region and undermine the viability of 
Eastern Nigeria, if the region eventually declared its secession and independence. It was 
further meant to sever the vast majority of Igbo from profitable coastal ports and rich oil 
fields that were recently discovered in the Niger Delta (Aremu, 2016:131). The 27 May 
1967 state creation exercise indeed ‚introduced a new rhetoric in the dynamics of Nigerian 
unity‛ and represented ‚a strategic move to clinically counter secession by the Eastern 
Regional Provinces from its inception‛ (Inyang; 2013:2). It brought to the fore the fact that 
the Eastern Region enjoyed no political unity as it contained numerous groups such as 
Igbo, Efik, Ibibio, Ijaw, and Eko people (Joseph, 2001:6). It should be noted that the 
strategy worked effectively. As Gowon rightly calculated, the Eastern Region minorities 
did not only refuse to support the Biafran cause, but also enlisted in large numbers in 
the federal army that defeated the Biafran forces.  
 The second war strategy of the FMG was the police action. This refers to a 
relatively localized military action, undertaken by regular armed forces, without a 
formal declaration of war. It is normally undertaken against guerrillas, insurgents or 
other forces held to be violators of national or international peace and order (The 
American Heritage Dictionary of English Language, 2013). The police action was 
carried out by the Nigerian Armed Forces as a form of military intervention within the 
framework of ‚aid to civil power‛ (Williams, 2002:100). This strategy was codified into 
law through the Police (Special Powers) Decree 24 of 1967. It granted the Chief of Staff, 
Supreme Headquarters and the Inspector General of Police the right to arrest and detain 
without trial, anyone suspected of any subversive act (Olukotun 2002:385). This 
ostensibly was aimed at getting Lt. Col. Ojukwu the ‘Biafran Head of State’ arrested as a 
way of scuffling the secessionist idea. But apart from that, the police action also 
constituted an attempt to ‚restore federal government’s authority in Lagos and the break-
away Eastern region‛ (Achebe, 2012:128). The police action no doubt marked the onset of 
the deployment of the Nigerian armed forces for the maintenance of internal security as 
a complement to the activities of the regular police and the Mobile Police force.   
 The FMG also employed propaganda as part of its war strategy, even though 
minimally. It is widely believed that propaganda is an important part of strategic 
planning in warfare. On the contrary, however, Yakubu Gowon made frantic efforts to 
ensure that the Nigerian information network played down the strength of the federal 
troops as if the conflict was a little disagreement between brothers; and that was what 
was relayed to the western media. Decker (2016) even submits that Gowon did not 
conduct the war as if he was fighting an enemy. In essence, General Yakubu Gowon’s 
strong motive during the civil war was not to crush an enemy but to keep Nigeria one. 
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As a patriot and Head of Government, he did not see the Biafran side as a thing that 
must be crushed. Rather, Gowon saw the war as a struggle of Nigerians and his 
emphasis was ‘how do we keep Nigeria together’. His basic commitment was to unite the 
country, to keep Nigeria one, not to win a war, not to defeat an opponent, not to crush a 
rebellion. ‚For him, it was ‘how do we bring this nation as an indivisible body’?’’  
 Rather than embarking on any form of persuasive propaganda, he only 
institutionalized some slogans. According to Ngoa (2011:244), slogans can simply be 
referred to as rhymes with a natural sense of rhythm. They are short, simple and precise 
in delivering a message. They are words or a sentence put together to symbolize an 
event, issue, idea, policy or condition. The most common slogan invoked by the Federal 
Military Government and which was widely broadcast on Radio Nigeria and Television 
was ‚to keep Nigeria one, is a task that must be done‛. Similarly, phrases like 'One Nigeria', 
'to preserve the territorial integrity of Nigeria', and 'crush the revolt' were also constant 
features on the Nigerian media (Davies, 1995: 157). This was supported by a mantra 
created with the letters of the surname of the Head of State, GOWON which reads: ‚GO 
ON WITH ONE NIGERIA‛. This was done by the Federal Government to make the war 
look a just cause to stop the disintegration of the country (Atofarati, 1992:10; Davies, 
1995: 157).  
 It is essential to note, however that all these highlighted strategies failed to effect 
the re-integration of Biafra into Nigeria. This necessitated the adoption of a new 
strategy of economic blockade by the Federal Military Government of Nigeria. It was 
adopted largely because the Federal Army was probably incapable of conquering the 
Ibo heartland by direct assault. For instance, in June 1968, Gowon promised that "there 
would be no attempt by the Federal troops to drive into the heart of the East-Central state and no 
pursuit of the Biafrans into their homeland except as a last resort after all appeals to Biafra had 
failed" (Kirk-Greene, 1971:53; Clevenger, 1975:123). In such a situation, a total economic 
blockade of the territory still under Biafra’s control offered one of the most effective and 
least-costly means of eroding the secessionists’ resistance (Clevenger, 1975:122-123).   
 Without much doubt, it was glaring that starvation was considered a legitimate 
weapon of war by the FGN largely out of desperation (Achebe, 2012:228,233). The main 
exponent of this was Chief Obafemi Awolowo, the then Minister of Finance who 
declared in a speech in June 1969 that: ‚I don't see any need why we should feed our enemies 
fat only to fight us harder‛ (Clevenger, 1975:123-124; Guardian, 27 June, 1969). He added 
that ‚the best way to end this fratricidal war is to stop the food allocation going to the Biafra 
region‛ (Daniel, 2013). Adewale (2012) reports that Awolowo decided to be so hard 
because food supplies to the civilian population in the East were being intercepted by 
the Biafran army and did not get to the target audience. Given that scenario, Awolowo 
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said: ‚so I decided to stop sending the food there. In the process, the civilians would suffer, but 
the soldiers suffered most‛ (Adewale, 2012). Brigadier Hassan Katsina, the then Chief of 
Staff of the Federal Army supported Awolowo. He said: ‚I would not feed somebody I am 
fighting‛. The expressions of these leading members of cabinet, as stated above, were 
considered callous by the Times Magazine in its editorial of 28 June, 1969 which 
condemned the FMG for adopting a policy of famine, food shortage and starvation. It 
read thus:  
 
 All the evidence now shows that starvation as an act of war is the effective policy of the 
 Nigerian Government… One can be left in no doubt that the Government of Nigeria, 
 whatever intentions it may have had at the beginning of the war, is now prepared to use 
 blockade and starvation, even at the cost of a further million deaths., rather than agree to 
 secession. This has the effect of a policy of genocide (Clevenger, 1975:124). 
 
 This philosophy, no doubt, informed the subsequent Federal blockade of the 
Biafran territory by air, land and sea. Biafra’s coastline was earlier sealed off in 1967 
essentially ‚to prevent the export of palm produce and crude oil so as to destroy the economic 
basis of the secessionist Republic, seen as a potent weapon for achieving quick victory‛ (Ikpe, 
1994: 94 cited in Iwuagwu, 2012: 284).This also robbed Biafra inhabitants of shipping 
ports to receive military and humanitarian supplies (Achebe, 2012:210). The Federal 
Government of Nigeria (FGN) also changed the Nigerian currency in January 1968 
purposely to render the Biafran currency non-convertible and virtually useless and 
thereby cut Biafra off from the international money markets (Adejumobi & Aderemi, 
2002:198; Chuku, 2002; 222). Awolowo had accused Ojukwu and his army of looting the 
Central Bank branches in Benin, Port Harcourt and Calabar. The need to prevent 
Ojukwu from taking the money to abroad to buy arms led to the change.  
 As a result of the economic blockade, Biafra experienced acute fuel shortage; hike 
in prices of foodstuffs, goods and services and the level of economic hardship 
intensified, beginning from May, 1968. Aboyade and Ayida (1971) cited in Adejumobi & 
Aderemi (2002:197) reported that then, a cup of gari was sold for over one pound while 
a cup of salt sold for 15 Biafran pounds during the period of economic and trade 
embargo, instead of the six Biafran pounds at the onset of the war. This astronomical 
increase in prices of goods was also substantiated by Harneit-Sievers et al, (1997: 113 
cited in Iwuagwu (2012: 285) that ‚a chicken in 1968 cost five Biafra pounds (£5:16s:8d or 
$14) while a young goat went as high as twenty-five pounds‛. 
 It is expedient to observe that the starvation and economic blockade strategy 
only succeeded in accentuating Eastern region’s acute food shortage. Ikpe, (1994), cited 
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in Iwuagwu (2012: 280-281) identified the factors responsible for this to include: ‚the 
influx of refugees (from Northern Nigeria); total economic blockade; mobilization of 
men and materials for the Biafra Army; military operation resulting in population 
displacement; and, the capture of the food surplus areas of the Cross River Basin 
especially Ibibioland, Bende, Abakiliki and the Rivers areas by the federal troops in the 
early months of the war‛. Others mentioned by Iwuagwu (2012:281 ) are: ‚general 
insecurity, which was not conducive for agricultural pursuits; loss of farmlands following 
evacuation of people from conquered territories and movement into lands hitherto reserved for 
cultivation; looting of barns and farmlands by soldiers‛. Iwuagwu (2012:281) adds that 
‚plantations, farm settlements and other agricultural establishments that characterized 
government policies at the time were abandoned. Even the aggressive marketing of fertilizer and 
other government agricultural extension services suffered severe neglect. More than ever before, 
food crop production came under severe threat as the outbreak of the war disrupted food 
production, resulting in massive food importation given that the conducive environment 
necessary for agricultural production was lacking‛.  
 The consequent effects of food scarcity were starvation, malnutrition and other 
nutritional syndromes and diseases (Life, July 12, 1968; Mathieu-Comtois, 2012). By the 
third quarter of 1968, thousands of people were reportedly dying daily (St. Jorre, 
1972:384). Indeed, the total blockade imposed on Biafra drastically affected the masses 
who suffered high degree of impoverishment (Onumonu and Anutanwa, 2017). It is 
interesting to note that this strategy of economic blockade proved highly effective. It 
weakened Biafra’s resistance and ensured its sudden collapse. For instance, a British 
correspondent, touring the Biafra enclave one week before the collapse of Biafra, 
reported that as the flow of relief supplies dwindled, Biafrans were giving up their 
struggle saying: "people are now choosing, in large numbers, to risk massacre at Federal hands 
rather than die slowly from starvation in a shrinking enclave..." (Sunday Times, 11 January, 
1970; Clevenger, 1975:122). This perhaps informed Ogbudinkpa’s submission that the 
Federal Army won the war due largely to the ‚the collapse of the Biafran economy… due to 
the shortage of food‛ (Ogbudinkpa, 1985: 58, cited in Iwuagwu, 2012:284 ). 
 The situation became extremely hopeless when attempts by relief and donor 
agencies and organisations to ameliorate the situation was virtually blocked by the two 
belligerent parties as they failed to agree on corridors of relief items into Biafra. It is 
essential to note that most of the limits imposed on the actions of the relief agencies 
stemmed from the failure of the belligerents to conclude any agreement on methods 
and routes by which food and medicine could be imported. From the earliest days of 
their involvement in the Biafran relief operation, the agencies had recognized that only 
the establishment of approved relief corridors offered a real prospect of moving into the 
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enclave the volume of food required to meet the nutritional needs of the civilian 
population (Clevenger, 1975:116). As such, although the international community did 
not stint in its provision of material resources for relief operations, the refusal of its 
leading members to act to break the political impasse over relief corridors condemned 
thousands in the war zone to starvation (Clevenger, 1975:177).  
 
3.5 Awolowo and the management of the Nigerian economy in the war years 
At the outbreak of the Nigerian Civil War, the Nigerian government was reportedly 
inadequately prepared for war. Even, the government was not prepared for a 
protracted war. At the end however, government had spent an estimated sum of £301.5 
million to prosecute the war (Awolowo, 1970). It is pathetic to note that the resources 
hurriedly deployed to the war were originally earmarked for the last lap of the 1962/68 
national development plan. Government then had to contend with a number of 
economic challenges such as to: 
a) economize Nigeria’s financial resources; 
b) raise additional revenue; 
c) save Nigeria’s foreign exchange reserve from being run down  
to a dangerous level; 
d) avoid balance of payments difficulties and  
e) preserve the strength of the Nigerian pound 
 Some of the major polices implemented to overcome these challenges were: 
a) all government Ministries (except Defence and Internal Affairs) were compelled 
to make 1% savings in their approved estimates of expenditure for 1967/68 
financial year. 
b) no ministry was allowed to increase its expenditure beyond the 1967/68 figures 
c) all capital projects of the Federal Government were put on hold, except on 
agriculture and roads. 
d) introduction of 20% capital gains tax on all incorporated companies. 
e) introduction of terminal dues on all ships evacuating mineral oil from Nigerian 
ports. 
f) amendment of the Income Tax Decrees through which the Federal Board of 
Inland Revenue to impose Turnover Tax on volumes of trade of company 
whether or not profits were recorded by a company for the particular years. 
g) Federal Ministry of Finance initiated the grant of £5 million annually to the States 
for agricultural development. 
h) drastic reduction of imports 
i) total ban was placed on some luxury goods. (Awolowo,1970) 
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 As the Federal Commissioner for Finance, Awolowo’s prudent management of 
the war economy yielded a positive result. Nigeria did not borrow any money from any 
country. This positioned the FMG to launch its post-war policy of reconciliation, 
rehabilitation and reconstruction. 
 
3.6 Awolowo’s involvement in the formulation and implementation of the post-war 
programme of reconciliation, rehabilitation and reconstruction.  
The end of hostilities in January 1970 came with its own challenges. Properties worth 
millions of naira were destroyed, including houses, hospitals, schools, roads and 
churches. Lives running into millions were also lost to the war while many were 
internally displaced. This largely accounts for the programme of reconciliation, 
rehabilitation and reconstruction that was launched by government immediately after 
the civil war. According to Gowon (2017), the programme was facilitated by Chief 
Awolowo who insisted that government’s post-war spending should be devoted to 
development rather than to the military. 
 Luckily, government had enough fund to finance the programme. According to 
Awolowo, he ensured that the revenue which was due to the East Central State 
throughout the war years, particularly, the subvention of 990,000 pounds per month, 
was kept and saved for them. Upon their liberation, the money, running into millions of 
pounds, was handed over to them. The money served like a take-off grant for the 
reintegrated Igbo East Central State. Such a large fund could have been embezzled or 
misappropriated by some other government officials, but Awolowo released the money 
to the owners at the appropriate time. Given the above submission, one may say that 
the argument that after the civil war, he did not assist the East Central State financially 
as the federal minister of finance was largely unfounded.  
 
4. Conclusion 
 
Obafemi Awolowo may, for long, remain the most controversial figure in the political 
history of Nigeria as a result of his role during the civil war. While the Igbo of Eastern 
region see him as their arch enemy responsible for their failed secession attempt (1967-
1970), apologists of Nigeria unity agenda consider him as a hero. According to Yakubu 
Gowon (2017), ‚Awolowo teamed up with us and helped keep Nigeria together without 
borrowing a kobo during the war. He and the team of elders, who were in my government at that 
time, advised us, and we took a decision that was in the best interest of Nigeria‛. With the 
above statement by the Head of State during the war years, Awolowo may be said to 
have been exonerated from all accusations of pursuing self-ambition and for 
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unilaterally implemented the war strategies, especially that of starvation, currency 
change and the 20 pounds policy at the end of the war. His actions and utterances of 
that period were done in good faith and had truly altruistic motive to save his 
fatherland from disintegration. Anybody in his shoes could have done the same thing 
to achieve the same purpose. It may therefore be suggested that Obafemi Awolowo 
made significant contributions to midwife Nigeria’s re-invented unity and integration 
at the end of the civil war of 1967-1970, which is not only volatile, but has remained 
largely fragile.  
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